The Performance Right Juncture: Compositions
Two exclusive rights of copyright are at the heart of the worldwide business of music. They involve musical compositions and sound recordings, the rights of copyright owners and limitations on those rights, and how creators and copyright owners are compensated.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act, in fact, reads as follows:
“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the following:
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and]
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”1
In the world of traditional media—radio and television primarily—music licensing has evolved into a fairly straightforward process. For musical compositions, songwriters, composers, and music publishers join or affiliate with ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC (performing rights organizations or PROs), which negotiate license agreements for the use of music, collect the fees, and distribute them back to writers and publishers who have performances in specific media. If the PRO and a user cannot come to an agreement as to license fees, courts intervene and determine “reasonable fees” for music use.
In the area of sound recordings, performances on traditional over-the-air radio are exempt from royalties and considered as “promotional” tools to drive sales. A record company’s main source of income, other than record sales, comes from the licensing of master recordings to television series, feature films, and advertising commercials, among other uses.
However, with the onset of the online/digital world the business has become much more complex.
Musical Compositions and the PROs
In the United States, there are three primary organizations that represent songwriters, composers, and music publishers on a non-exclusive basis in the negotiation, collection, and distribution of music performance license fees. The organizations are the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP, 1914); Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI, 1939); and SESAC (1930). They are referred to as performing rights organizations (PROs). The primary sources of license fees are traditional radio, broadcast and cable television, and general licensing (live performance, music in bars and restaurants, etc.).
New media license fees, which include online and digital music services, currently represent a relatively small portion of U.S. domestic music license fees, approximately $100 million of a total annual U.S. domestic PRO collection of $1.4 billion. Royalty distributions are made 50 percent to writers and 50 percent to music publishers after operating costs are taken into account, about 12-13 percent in the case of ASCAP foreign and BMI. There is a PRO in practically every country of the world where, via reciprocal agreements with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, U.S. writers’ and publishers’ works are represented and paid for when performances occur in foreign territories.
ASCAP and BMI both entered into consent decrees with the government in 1941. Amendments to those decrees were signed with ASCAP in 1950, 1960, and 2001 and in 1966 and 1994 with BMI. One aspect of these decrees that has had a significant effect on the determination of license fees is the existence of a separate “rate court” for ASCAP and for BMI. This comes into play when the PRO and a music user cannot come to a negotiated agreement as to what “reasonable” license fees should be in any given area. The decree allows any party to apply to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for a determination of interim and final fees. These rate courts have been in existence with ASCAP since 1950 and with BMI since 1994, and have determined fees and license terms for the major traditional media areas of radio and broadcast and cable television, as well as, in recent years, the online music community. It is in these latter “new media” decisions and settlements where most of today’s complex issues have arisen.
SESAC, the smallest of the U.S. PROs, operates on a for-profit basis as opposed to the nonprofit operations of ASCAP and BMI, is not governed by a consent decree with the government, and does not have a “rate court” procedure for license fee adjudications and disputes. Nevertheless, under a recent October 2014 settlement with the Television Music License Committee (TMLC) regarding a class action antitrust suit involving local television stations, SESAC has agreed to a binding arbitration for any future licensing fee disputes with the settlement class that cannot be resolved by negotiation. It was further agreed that SESAC could not interfere with the ability of any affiliate to issue a public performance rights license directly to a settlement class member. A final settlement approval hearing is set for March 2015 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.2
In the online world of music licensing, the ASCAP rate court has been instrumental in deciding not only what “reasonable” license fees should be but also what is actually licensable by the U.S. PROs. Interim fee and final fee decisions have involved many of the biggest players in the “new media/technology” world and have resulted in license fees significantly below what the PROs and copyright owners were requesting.
To put the online fees into perspective, ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC collected approximately $1.4 billion in domestic U.S. license fees from radio, broadcast and cable television, and venues where live music is played. Of this amount, approximately only $100 million was generated from all online/digital uses. An additional $700 million is received each year by the U.S. PROs from foreign collection societies like PRS, GEMA, SACEM, SIAE, SGAE, SOCAN, APRA, IMRO for performances of U.S. writers’ works performed in foreign countries. A small portion of that money is attributable to online uses. Most publishers, incidentally, collect their foreign country performance royalties directly from those societies as direct members or through sub-publishers.
Commencing with the 2007 AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo case, rate court filings, hearings, and decisions have involved YouTube, MobiTV, AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless, Spotify, Ericsson, and Netflix, among others.3 A brief summary of some of the most important points of these cases should help in understanding the current status of online performance licensing:
The AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo rate court case had major worldwide significance, as there was a summary judgment ruling that the downloading of a music file did not constitute a public performance under the Copyright Act—a ruling totally contrary to the laws of most other countries with the exception of Canada.4 This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,5 with certification denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.6 The Second Circuit also remanded the fee formula back to the district court for further proceedings.
The 2009 Verizon Wireless rate court case reaffirmed the AOL “no performance in a download” decision in a ruling that stated that the transmission of a ringtone to a cellular telephone customer did not constitute a performance, and that the mechanical ringtone rate of $0.24 per download was the only appropriate right and compensation involved.7 The primary issue of the 2009 AT&T case was whether previews of ringtones were to be considered “fair use” rather than licensable performances.8 The court ruled in favor of ASCAP, and a customer’s previewing of ringtones was therefore licensable by the PROs. An interim 2009 decision regarding YouTube was a good example of the size of court-set “reasonable” music license fees, with an order of $70,000 a month.9
The 2010 MobiTV case involved what a reasonable license fee should be for the delivering of television programming to mobile telephones and audio channels. In this case, the court returned to the early 1990s ASCAP performance licenses with Turner Broadcasting that set a three-tiered license based on the music intensity of the program. The music intensive fee was 0.9 percent of defined revenue, with 0.375 percent for general entertainment and 0.1375 percent for news and sports programming.10 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court decision.11
All of the aforementioned cases were eventually settled, with additional settlements and agreements entered into with Apple, Rdio, Spotify, Netflix, Hulu, and others. Practically all settlements in this area are confidential.
Two additional rate court cases, DMX and Pandora, involved not only the determination of reasonable license fees but also the role that direct licensing plays in the PRO licensing picture. Under the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, the agreements that writers and music publishers sign with ASCAP and BMI are nonexclusive—members and affiliates are allowed to directly license their works to a music user and bypass the PRO structures entirely.
DMX is a leading background and foreground music service provider that provides preprogrammed music for business establishments via direct broadcast satellites or on-premises delivery mechanisms. DMX hired a company to assist and design a direct licensing program with copyright owners that eventually resulted in direct licenses representing over 7,000 catalogs, including one major music publisher, Sony. DMX was requesting from ASCAP and BMI a “through-to-the-audience” blanket license that reflected the DMX direct licenses already obtained as well as those to be negotiated in the future.
In July 2010, the BMI rate court entered a final rate for the blanket license subject to adjustment of DMX’s BMI performances directly licensed.12 In a separate decision, the ASCAP rate court ruled that ASCAP is required to issue to DMX a blanket license with “carve-outs” for the direct licensing program.13 Both decisions were appealed to the Second Circuit, which in June 2012 affirmed the district court decisions.14 The resulting rates significantly reduced the license fees that DMX was paying to ASCAP and BMI.
Pandora is the leading Internet customized radio service and is considered a non-interactive service as opposed to an ondemand/interactive service where the user chooses what he or she wants to hear. Pandora entered into license agreements with both ASCAP and BMI in 2005 and terminated those licenses at the end of 2010 and 2012, respectively. In the case of ASCAP, Pandora applied to the court for a through-to-the-audience blanket license for the period 2011 through 2015. In the case of BMI, Pandora filed an application for a five-year license commencing January 1, 2013.
Based primarily on the small license fees that were awarded by the ASCAP and BMI rate court judges commencing with the AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo case in 2007, the major music publishers, starting with EMI, later acquired by Sony, notified ASCAP and BMI that they were withdrawing their catalogs for online licensing purposes. The majors felt strongly that they could negotiate more financially acceptable online value deals than the arrangements that had been set by prior rate court decisions and the subsequent settlements emanating from those decisions.
These online media withdrawals were accomplished by specific changes in the rules, regulations, and practices of ASCAP and BMI. Upon withdrawing their works, a number of the publishers entered into direct licensing deals with Pandora, in effect creating a system whereby Pandora had licenses with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, as well as short-term negotiated direct performance licenses with the major publishers. Discussions were also held between ASCAP, BMI, and the major publishers with a view toward ASCAP and BMI handling the administration of the online licenses negotiated by the publishers.
In response to a motion for summary judgment in September 2013, Judge Cote rule that a selective withdrawal of new media rights by publisher members could not be implemented without violating the consent decree, and further that the ASCAP repertory subject to that license is all works in ASCAP at the time Pandora applied for a license (January 1, 2011)—not when the final license is arrived at.15
In short, an application for a license is treated as a license in effect and in this case no works could be removed by any ASCAP member during the period 2011 through 2015. And when a publisher finally removes works, those works have to be removed for all licensing purposes, not just for online licensing. Any users with license agreements still in effect at the time of the withdrawal could continue to use the withdrawn works up until their specific license agreement expires.
In a similar motion for summary judgment in the BMI case, Judge Stanton allowed the removal of works that occurred prior to January 1, 2013, but ruled that those works could not be licensed by BMI to any others after any existing license agreements expired.16 If BMI cannot offer those compositions to new media applicants, their availability does not meet the standards of the BMI decree and they cannot be held in the BMI repertory. The BMI-Pandora rate court trial is set for 2015.
To put both judges’ “all in or all out” summary judgment decisions in perspective, if one were to remove works from the current $100 million PRO annual license fee area of the online world, one would be forced eventually to remove those works from the other $1.3 billion in PRO domestic license fees being generated by traditional media, i.e. radio, broadcast and cable television, and live music venues. Not to mention the two-year effect that such withdrawals would have on the reciprocal “flow through of money” agreements between foreign collection societies and the U.S. PROs. As a point of reference, it is important to note that practically all new PRO licensing deals with traditional media, like radio and television, include streaming, website music uses, mobile apps, digital and primary broadcasts, mobile and wireless platforms, webcasts, and multicasts.
On March 14, 2014, Judge Cote issued her “determination of reasonable license fees” 136-page decision in the ASCAP-Pandora rate court case.17 The judge ruled that the appropriate fee for the years 2011-2015 was 1.85 percent of revenue less certain deductions. ASCAP had requested a rate of 1.85 percent for 2011 and 2012, 2.5 percent for 2013, and 3 percent for 2014 and 2015. Pandora had requested a rate between the current 1.7 per cent traditional radio rate (Pandora had acquired a small radio station in an attempt to qualify for this rate) and 1.85 percent (the ASCAP form rate in effect for Pandora since 2005).
Musical Compositions and Performance Collections
An important issue in the Pandora rate court proceedings, as shown, involved the concept of the divisibility of copyrights, which allows a publisher/copyright owner to make deals with various classes of users for their catalog. Another is the disparity in payments between artists and record companies and songwriters and music publishers for the same type of performance. We turn to this next.
The AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo 2007 court case provided evidence of over $30 million paid by these services to the major record companies. Their fees to the PROs were, in comparison, very small. As to Pandora, the company expended in 2013 approximately $315 million of its total revenue of $600 million on content acquisition. Of that amount, close to $290 million went to SoundExchange for artists and record companies, with all three PROs collecting a total of less than $25 million for songwriters and publishers. As a point of additional reference, total 2013 limited performance right statutory royalties to SoundExchange were $650 million in addition to significant record company interactive streaming license fees and payments negotiated with the services, whereas combined ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC revenue for all new media uses from all licenses and services was less than $100 million.
In July 2014, ASCAP, along with Universal Music Publishing, Sony/ATV Music, and EMI Music as intervenors filed an appeal from the two district court opinions with the Second Circuit.18 The basis of the appeal was that the district court erred in ruling that the amended final judgment of 2001 prohibited ASCAP from accepting partial grants of public performance rights, and that the district court in setting a final license fee ignored recent arms-length relevant benchmark agreements.
As to the “partial grants” prohibition, ASCAP’s position was that the consent decree long ago removed any prohibition on the right of members to reserve for themselves the right grant exclusive licensing rights to music users. Further, such a prohibition is in direct conflict with the exclusive rights provided by the copyright law to copyright owners.
As to the issue of ignoring benchmark agreements in the setting of final reasonable license fees, ASCAP pointed out that the Universal Music, Sony/ATV Music, and EMI Music Pandora direct license deals were all in excess of the 1.85 percent court-set fee, as was the 2013 negotiated ASCAP Apple iTunes radio license—all “arms-length willing buyer and willing seller agreements.” Further, the Second Circuit, in its 2010 RealNetworks/Yahoo decision, confirmed that a 2.5 percent rate was a valid benchmark even though it vacated the district court’s across-the-board application of that rate to all of RealNetworks’ and Yahoo’s services.19 Accordingly, the current district court erred in ignoring the Second Circuit’s guidance in RealNetworks/Yahoo, which established that a rate of 2.5 percent revenue (or higher) is reasonable for all-audio, music-intensive digital music services similar to Pandora’s.
Decentralization
The ability of a copyright owner to directly license a work to a music user and bypass the PROs was a major issue in the ASCAP and BMI DMX rate court decisions as well as the current Pandora litigation. Language in both the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees guarantees the right of any member or affiliate to directly license their works to a user. SESAC, as it is not under a consent decree with the government, incorporates language in its writer and publisher affiliation agreements that insures the right to directly license—”publisher retains the right to issue nonexclusive licenses directly to any third person for the public performance in the United States, its territories and possessions, of any work subject to this Agreement.”
When songwriters, composers, and music publishers join or affiliate with ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC, they sign representation agreements granting to the PRO the nonexclusive right to license the non-dramatic public performances of their works. Though each PRO contract and governing documents are different as to their terms, length of contract, withdrawal of works and resignation/termination provisions, dispute resolution procedures, payment schedules, distribution rules, and benefits, they all are non-exclusive agreements whereby the writer or publisher can license a work directly. The PROs cannot interfere in any way with this right or the ability to exercise this right.
Language as to the ability to directly license as well as the effect of a direct license has been standard in many types of industry license agreements, including work-for-hire/employee for-hire contracts, for many decades. A sample clause might read:
The performing rights in the composition, to the extent permitted by law, shall be assigned to and licensed by the applicable performing rights organization with said organization authorized to collect and receive all monies earned from the public performance of the composition and to pay the writers and publishers directly. If to the extent it is unlawful for the PRO, or any of its affiliates, to issue blanket small performing rights licenses or the applicable performing rights society does not from time to time, for any reason whatsoever maintain a regular system of collecting performance fees and/or a third-party licensee (i.e., a television network, independent television station, digital music service, etc.) requires direct licensing of such rights, company and publisher shall have the right to directly license their respective shares of the public performance rights in the composition to such third parties. If the company or publishing designee receives a distribution of earned public performance fees from any source that does not make a separate distribution directly or indirectly to publisher and to composer, then publisher shall be entitled to receive its portion of such fees and composer shall be entitled to receive the writer’s share of such fees.
Additional variations of a direct license clause are as follows:
Licensee desires to obtain from publisher a blanket license for all necessary performance, reproduction, and distribution rights implicated by the delivery of programming embodying publisher’s catalog, and publisher is willing to grant such right to license on a nonexclusive basis.
The right to publicly perform and to authorize others to perform the composition by means of a media entity not licensed by ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC is subject to clearance of the performing right either from Licensor or from any other duly authorized licensor acting for or on behalf of Licensor subject to good faith negotiations in accordance with established industry customs and practices.
An issue in many agreements is what happens to the writer share when a copyright owner, usually the music publisher, directly licenses a work to a user. Clauses range from “payments to be made based upon the prevailing PRO rates for the specific use,” “compensation to be negotiated in good faith,” “reasonable fee,” “fee subject to arbitration,” “a complete buyout with no further compensation or continuing royalties,” or “50 per cent of any license fee received.”
A further unresolved issue as to an allowable and effective direct license under court or consent decree interpretation involves the situation where a music user (traditional broadcaster, online music service, etc.) contacts a copyright owner directly with the request versus the situation where the ASCAP or BMI copyright owner approaches the user to negotiate a direct license—a fine distinction but an important one in current litigation and consent decree interpretation.
Arbitration
In part because of the Pandora decisions, a major development occurred in June 2014 when the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it would review both the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees “to account for changes in how music is delivered to and experienced by listeners [and to determine] what modifications would be appropriate.”20 The DOJ allowed a 60-day period for comments from any interested party (music publishers, songwriters and composers, PROs, online service companies, music users of any nature, and the general public). A cross-section of some of the views was illustrative of the issues as well as the diametrically opposed positions of many of the parties.
On the music user side, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the Digital Media Association (DiMA), Netflix, Fox News, the Radio Music License Committee (RMLC), the National Restaurant Association, and the Consumer Electronics Association, among others, submitted comments. The creator/copyright representative side included comments from the PROs ASCAP, BMI, PRS for Music (U.K.), SOCAN (Canada), JASRAC (Japan), and SIAE (Italy), as well as the Society of Composers and Lyricists (SCL), the Nashville Songwriters Association International (NSAI), the National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA), and the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA), among others.
ASCAP, in its comments, requested that the rate court be replaced with a faster and cheaper dispute resolution procedure, that ASCAP be allowed to bundle and license multiple rights (the current decree prohibits ASCAP from licensing any right other than performance) and allow partial grants of rights from its members.21 The arguments centered on the fact that new media users need multiple rights in their business, that publishers need flexibility to manage rights and negotiate contracts terms, and that property rights are divisible, assignable, and licensable either in whole or in part. BMI, which is not prevented from bundling or licensing multiple rights, requested that publishers be allowed to withdraw digital rights and that a binding arbitration model replace the consent decree mandate.22
The Society of Composers and Lyricists (SCL), an interest group for film and television composers and songwriters, was in favor of consent decree changes and expressed concerns that if the major music publishers withdrew completely from ASCAP and BMI, the transparency and accountability of the PRO collective licensing model would be affected, and further that in a bundled rights situation it would be difficult to ascertain the value of the performance right in bundled transactions.23 Most writers in this field sign “work-for-hire” contracts where the backend performance royalties represent a substantial portion of their income. The 165,000 member organization SAG-AFTRA, the largest labor union representing working media artists, commented that the scales have tipped too far in favor of licensees’ interests over those of artists and that the rate setting process set forth by the consent decrees is inefficient, expensive, and burdensome on the PROs, and if not modified will significantly devalue a writer’s works.24
Sony/ATV Music supported amending the consent decrees to allow copyright owners the ability to limit the scope of the rights they grant to ASCAP and BMI in their musical compositions and to require the PROs to accept those grants; supported an expedited an arbitration process for resolving rate disputes; and recommended that the reviews of the decrees occur periodically to take into account new technology changes and conditions. Sony/ATV was not in favor of allowing the PROs to handle rights other than performing rights, as it was their position that these markets already functioned well and that the introduction of such regulated entities into the market for these other rights would be costly and disruptive.25
As to the foreign PROs that submitted comments, widespread concern centered on the belief that the current consent decrees were outdated in today’s world and that changes were essential if music was to be appropriately licensed and compensated. Partial grants of rights and the bundling of multiple rights are commonplace in the foreign marketplace, and dispute resolution procedures are less cumbersome than the U.S. rate court. PRS for Music in the United Kingdom, which receives over $100 million a year in U.S. performance royalties for its members from ASCAP and BMI, expressed concerns over the present decrees and stated that it would consider licensing the British repertory directly in the United States rather than through intermediaries if it proved more efficient.26
DiMA, a trade organization whose members include Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and YouTube, stated that the decrees have not harmed ASCAP or BMI financially in terms of the music industry generally, and that the PROs must be subject to oversight as their anticompetitive behavior continues to this day. Further, if the DOJ does allow all the PROs to bundle rights as well as permit partial withdrawals, then substantial oversight must be put in place; songwriters should be allowed to keep their rights with their PRO if that’s what they wanted, regardless of whether the publisher removed the works.27
The Radio Music Licensing Committee strongly felt that the decrees were necessary to keep the market power of ASCAP and BMI in check.28 If publishers were allowed to withdraw from the PROs, they could leverage their outsized market share to extract exorbitant license fees from licensees. Both the National Association of Broadcaster29 and Television Music License Committee also shared these views. As to Netflix, its position was that the decrees were in place to constrain the PROs market power.30 It was against allowing partial publisher withdrawals, but if the DOJ allowed them, then conditions would have to be imposed to mitigate any adverse consequences. Finally, the rate court must stay in place though it does need to be streamlined. (Editor’s Note: There has not yet been any resolution on the consent decree issue yet, but it has been widely reported that the DOJ will announce significant changes some time soon.)
Todd Brabec is author with Jeff Brabec of the bestseller Music, Money, and Success (New York, 7th Edn.).The piece was originally published in Entertainment and Sports Lawyer, a publication of the American Bar Association, Vol.31, No.4, Winter 2015, pp.1 and pp. 37-42. We will publish the second part of this article, which deals with the sound recording copyright, in the next edition of the MBJ
By Todd Brabec
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
2. See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-09177-PAE
3. See Todd Brabec & jeff Brabec, Online Music Licensing: From PROs, AOL, and AT&T, and the CRB, ENT.& Sports Law., Oct. 2011.
4. See United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
5. United States v. ASCAP, 627 F.Jd 64 (2d Cir. 2010).
6. ASCAP v. United States, 132 S. Ct.366 (2011 ).
7. re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
8. United States v. ASCAP, 599 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
9. United States v. ASCAP, 616 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
10. re MobiTV,lnc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 206 {S.D.N.Y. 2010).
11. ASCAP v. MobiTV, Inc., 681 F.Jd 76 (2d Cir. 2012).
12. Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc., 726 F. Su pp. 2d 355 {S.D.N.Y. 2010)
13. In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 516 {S.D.N.Y. 2010).
14. Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.Jd 32 (2d Cir. 2012).
15. /n re Pandora Media, Inc., Nos. 12 Civ.8035,41 Civ. 1395, 2013 WL5211927 {S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).
16. Broad. Music, I nc. v. Pa ndora Media, I nc., Nos. 13 Civ. 4037,64 Civ.3787,2013 WL 6697788{S.D.N .Y. Dec. 19, 2013).
17. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Su pp.3d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 201 4).
18. Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, No. 14-1158 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2014)
19. See United States v. ASCAP, 627 F.Jd 64 (2d Cir. 2010).
20. Antitmsr Consent Decree Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JusriCE (June 2014 ),
21. Public Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf.
22. Public Comments of Broadcast Music, I nc. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/a tr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307859.pdf.
23. Comments of the Society of Composer & Lyricists {Aug.6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/asca pbmi/comments/307971.pdf.
24. Comments of Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Aug.6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307818.pdf.
25. Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC Comments Submitted to the Department of justice in Connection with Its Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307983.pdf.
26. Antitrust Division Review of American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers {“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) Consent Decrees (“Review”) (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/a tr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307652.pdf.
27. Comments of Digital Media Association (“DiMA”) (2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307972.pdf.
28. Comments of the Radio Music License Committee, Inc. and the Television Music License Committee, LLC (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/com ments/307977.pdf.
29. Comments of National Association of Broadcasters (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/com ments/307974.pdf.
30. Comments of Netflix, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/commencs/307908.pdf.
